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1 Introduction
The ongoing Eurozone crisis has raised the debate about whether and how to stand by
a country close to default. Before the crisis, a common belief that the Eurozone would
not let one of its countries default had a significant impact on the countries’ borrowing
decisions. The example of the 2010 Greek debt crisis is edifying: the average maturity
of its portfolio started to shorten a few years before the bailout. Furthermore, the joint
intervention of the Eurozone and the IMF took place when the sovereign was unable to
rollover its maturing debt, and was aimed at helping Greece both rollover its debt and
pay its public expenditures. This first bailout did not put off default risk enough as it
was rapidly followed by a second one in 2012. In this context, I want first to understand
how potential bailouts affect the sovereign’s choice of debt maturity structure. Second, I
analyze how a bailout should optimally deal with the various maturities of the troubled
sovereign. Third, I characterize ex ante policies that could improve total welfare.
More generally, I study the case of a sovereign that receives an exogenous liquidity
need, and needs to borrow from the market. It expects to receive bailouts from deep-
pocket guarantors if the country finds itself on the verge of a default. The guarantors
can be thought of as a group of countries that would be affected by a default or the in-
ternational community. In the framework, the country cannot commit to repay its debt,
and potential guarantors cannot commit not to bailout the country. More precisely, I link
the debtor country’s incentive to repay (and therefore its ability to borrow) to its cost of
default, and the guarantors’ incentive to help to the spillover cost they incur if the country
defaults. In fact, the country repays its debt if it is less costly than a default, and the
guarantors bail out the country if it is less costly than to let the country default. The
country’s cost of default can include reputation costs, a reduced access to international fi-
nancial markets, or the threat of sanctions. The spillover cost guarantors incur can include
economical as well as political considerations such as a reduced trade, banking exposures,
the fear of a run, or the end of the European construction in the case of the EU.
Hence, a country with a large cost of default is able to reimburse a large amount of debt
and can therefore borrow extensively. Potential guarantors who would be very hurt by
a default are likely to contribute a lot to bail out the country (nuisance power). In this
situation, the country’s borrowing capacity is determined by both its own cost of default
and the collateral damage its default creates on potential guarantors.
I consider an endowment economy with a finite horizon where the country’s income
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realization is random. There are two sources of market incompleteness: (i) the debt is-
sued by the country is non-contingent and (ii) there is lack of commitment from both
the country and potential guarantors. As a result, there are states of nature in which
the country cannot or does not want to repay/rollover its debt, so that a default can
happen along the equilibrium path. Yet, potential guarantors can decide to bail out the
country by repurchasing some of its claims. In this case, they do so to prevent a default
in the current period and avoid the spillover damage of a default. The debtor country
borrows from a large number of foreign lenders. They are competitive, risk-neutral and do
not incur any spillover cost in case of a default, on top of the forgone repayment of the debt.
I first study the optimal choice of debt maturity structure of the sovereign that in-
ternalizes the potential bailouts from the guarantors. I find three main zones depending
on the sovereign’s liquidity need: in the low liquidity need zone, the country chooses to
borrow a low level of long-term debt only, in order to hedge against a risk of default in the
short-term while remaining under the umbrella of the potential guarantors in the long-
term. In the intermediate liquidity need zone, the country borrows more short-term debt,
and takes a risk of default in the long-term where the size of the debt, possibly increased
by rollovers, may discourage the potential guarantors. Eventually, in the high liquidity
need zone, the country over-borrows on the short maturity, and takes a risk of default in
the short-term where the size of the debt may be too large for a rollover as well as for a
bailout.
Simple insights can be derived. The larger the liquidity need the sovereign faces, the more
it increases its level of borrowings and the more it relies on short-term debt. Indeed,
short-term debt presents a borrowing capacity advantage relative to long-term debt, as
there are less options to default over a short period than over a long one and as a con-
sequence the default risk is lower. This explains why short-term debt is more valuable
in situations of high liquidity needs. In the presence of potential bailouts, the sovereign’s
borrowing capacity is increased because it not only pledges expected future revenues but
also potential bailouts. Therefore, the reliance on short-term debt is reinforced in situa-
tions of high liquidity needs because the sovereign is able to pledge a potential bailout in
the short-term to maximize its borrowing capacity. Interestingly, the set of liquidity needs
where the sovereign relies more on short-term debt is larger in the presence of bailouts.
Hence, as short-term debt is associated with rollover risk, there are more default risks in
this situation.
Second, I study the form of the optimal bailout from potential guarantors. When they
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want to prevent a default in the current period, they have the choice between repurchas-
ing short-term debt, long-term debt, or both, in order to make it incentive-compatible for
the sovereign to rollover and/or repay the rest of its maturing debt. On the one hand,
repurchasing short-term debt alleviates the net present value of the debt burden in the
current period without changing it in the following ones. On the other hand, repurchasing
long-term debt alleviates the net present value of the debt burden both in the current
period and in the following ones. I find that repurchasing long-term debt is strictly opti-
mal when it makes the sovereign rollover and/or repay its debt in the current period and
in the following ones. In this case, it achieves two goals at the same time, i.e. prevent
a default today and in the future. It corresponds to a commitment effect : by commit-
ting to a bailout in the future, guarantors are able to make the country repay its debt
today (backloading result). Otherwise, repurchasing short-term debt is optimal. It corre-
sponds to an option value effect : guarantors choose to repurchase only short-term debt to
make the country rollover and/or repay the rest of its maturing debt. This achieves only
one goal, i.e. prevent a default today without taking care of what can happen in the future.
Third, potential bailouts affect negatively the guarantors’ ex post welfare while raising
the sovereign’s one on average. I study several instruments to alleviate this inefficiency
ex ante. On the one hand, a regulatory instrument consisting of a limit ratio on the ma-
turity structure contains the risk-taking behavior of the sovereign. Yet, total welfare is
lowered as it reduces the sovereign’s borrowing capacity in times of high liquidity needs by
limiting its ability to borrow short-term debt. On the other hand, an initial contractual
agreement between the country and guarantors where the country borrows from both the
market and guarantors can improve welfare and prevent the occurrence of any default at
the equilibrium. Intuitively, such a contract addresses directly the divergence of interests
between the country which aims at maximizing transfers and guarantors who would like
the country to minimize default risk.
To sum up, the presence of potential bailouts extends the initial borrowing capacity
of the sovereign and makes it rely more on short-term debt, which is at the origin of
more default risk on average. Short-term debt is used in times of high liquidity needs by
the sovereign to extend as much as possible its borrowing capacity by pledging both its
income in the short-term and the bailout it may receive as well at this same maturity. As
for the guarantors, repurchasing long-term debt in a bailout is strictly optimal when they
can prevent a default both today and in the future. Otherwise, repurchasing short-term
debt is optimal to prevent a default only today. Eventually, only an initial contractual
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agreement between the country and the guarantors can be welfare-improving because it
addresses directly the divergence of interests between the two parties.
Related literature This paper is related to several bodies of the literature. Papers such
as Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) study
the optimal debt contract under lack of commitment in an environment where markets
are complete. Yet, in such a framework, a default cannot happen at the equilibrium. This
paper thus follows the literature of sovereign debt under lack of commitment and incom-
plete markets, initiated by the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1986). As pointed
out by Arellano (2008), a default can happen at the equilibrium in such an environment.
In Calvo (1988), the government auctions off its borrowing level and lets the market
determine the interest rates. This leaves room for a multiplicity of equilibria driven by
expectations. Cole and Kehoe (2000) also analyze multiple equilibria to study self-fulfilling
crises brought about by a loss of confidence. In this paper, there is no multiplicity of equi-
libria as the country first sets the level of its repayments and lets the market determine
the interest rates and its initial borrowing level.
This paper builds on the existence of exogenous costs of default. These costs are essen-
tial in explaining sovereign repayments. They can be external, such as trade embargoes,
seizure of assets or military intervention (Sachs (1983) and Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz
(1986)), or internal as emphasized by recent research (Mengus (2014)).
Tirole (2015) investigates ex ante and ex post forms of solidarity towards an indebted
sovereign in the presence of default. Here, I carry out a similar analysis in a dynamic
setup where the maturity of debt is a choice of the sovereign. Several papers study the
debt maturity structure of a sovereign that can decide to default, without the ingredient
of solidarity. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012) build on the observation that the gov-
ernment interest rate spreads are low in normal times with the short-term spread being
lower than the long-term one. During emerging market crises, both spreads rise and the
short-term spread rises more than the long-term one. In parallel, the debt maturity short-
ens significantly. By analyzing the tradeoff between the incentive benefit of short-term
debt and the hedging benefit of long-term debt, the paper is able to make sense of these
observations. Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmuckler (2013) argue that lenders’ risk aversion
makes short-term borrowing cheaper. It explains why emerging economies tend to borrow
short-term and why they rely even more on short-term debt in periods of financial tur-
moil. This paper builds on these results with the new element of potential bailouts from
guarantors.
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I present the setup of the model in section 2. Then, I study the Principal’s optimal
bailout strategy in section 3. I can then solve for the country’s optimal borrowing strategy
in section 4. In section 5, I analyze the impact of potential bailouts. Section 6 studies some
simple extensions and discusses the results. In section 7, I carry out a welfare analysis and
study some ex ante policies that could be Pareto-improving. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Framework
This section develops a model of sovereign debt with three risk neutral economic agents.
The country borrows from the private sector (the market), which is competitive. Potential
guarantors (the Principal) can intervene to help the country if it cannot or does not want
to repay its debt.
There are 3 periods with a discount factor δ < 1 at each period. At dates t = 1, 2,
the country receives a random income according to a positively correlated process, with
ρ ≤ α ≤ ρ1. For simplicity, I assume that the income is yt > 0 in the good state of nature
for t = 1, 2, and 0 otherwise (see Figure 1). A zero income is to be interpreted as some
minimal level of consumption below which the country is not willing to go. At date 0,
the country has no money, can decide to borrow b0 against future incomes, and values
this borrowing at Rb0 with R ≥ 1. At date 1, the country may have some debt to repay,
and chooses whether to rollover and repay its maturing debt or to default. At date 2,
the country may have some debt to repay and its only decision is whether to repay or to
default.
There is no commitment in the sense that the country pays back its debt only if it
finds it privately optimal to do so, and the Principal bails out the country only if he finds
it privately optimal to do so. If the country chooses to default at date t, it defaults on all
its debt and incurs the default cost Φt > 0, which is the net present value of all the costs
implied by a default at date t. In turn, the Principal is affected by a spillover cost φt > 0,
which is the net present value of the costs he incurs when the country defaults at date t.
There is perfect information.
1This assumption corresponds to the persistence of sovereign incomes that is observed empirically (in
either good or bad states).
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Figure 1: Income Realizations
I assume that both the default cost and the spillover cost are weakly decreasing over
time, so that Φ1 ≥ Φ2 and φ1 ≥ φ2, and that the country’s default cost is larger than the
Principal’s spillover cost Φt >> φt for t = 1, 2.
The model is an extensive form game that can be solved by backward induction. I am
therefore looking for subgame perfect Nash equilibria where the optimal borrowing and
rollover strategies of the country, the optimal bailout of the Principal, and the interest
rates paid on debt are endogenously determined in the model. The timing of the model is
described in Figure 2.
Date 0: Borrowing. At date 0, the country borrows b0 from the market against claims
(d01, d
0
2) to be repaid at dates 1 and 2 respectively. As for the notation, dst is the amount of
debt the country has at the end of date s to repay at date t (after the bailout and rollover
decisions of date s took place). The additional upper script P denotes the level of debt
remaining after the bailout offer from the Principal and the upper script R the additional
amount of debt to be reimbursed at a given maturity after a rollover. I denote d01 the
short-term debt and d02 the long-term debt. The country values this borrowing at Rb0
(private benefit) where the parameter R measures the intensity of the country’s liquidity
needs. The higher the liquidity need R, the more the country is willing to borrow at date
0.
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Figure 2: Timing of the model
Given its liquidity need R, the country chooses (d01, d02) to maximize its expected utility of
date 0:
UC0 (R) = max{d01,d02}
{
Rb0 + E0
(
2∑
t=1
δt(yt − xtdtt − (1− xt)xt−1Φt)
)}
such that:
b0 =
d01
1 + r01
+
d02
(1 + r02)
2
where xt for t = 1, 2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country chooses to repay
at date t, and 0 if it chooses to default (with xt = 0 absorbing and x0 = 1). r01 and r02
are the one-period interest rates paid by the country at date 0 on debt due at dates 1
and 2 respectively. They are endogenously determined in the model as a result of the
randomness of incomes, the willingness of the country to repay and the behavior of the
Principal.
Dates 1 & 2: Income realizations. At the beginning of each period t = 1, 2, the country
receives its random income. Considering the income process, it cannot repay in the bad
state of nature because it has no income2. Assuming that yt > Φt, it can repay in the
2The decision to default is always a question of willingness. In this reduced form model, when the
country has a zero income and cannot repay any debt, it corresponds to a case where the country does
not want to tax its agents to repay its claims and chooses to default.
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good state of nature, but may not want to do so if it is more costly than to default.
Debt structure. At the beginning of period t, the debt structure is characterized by
{dt−1τ }2τ=t where dt−1τ is the remaining claim inherited from date t−1 to be paid at a future
date τ .
Bailout from the Principal. After the country’s income realization at date t, the Prin-
cipal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the country where he may propose to repurchase
some of the debt, either short-term, or long-term, or both if available. He does so if it
can prevent a default at the current period at a lower cost than the spillover damage.
More precisely, in the case where the country has no income at date t and the Principal
wants to prevent a default, he has to repurchase either a part of the claim of date t such
that the country is able to rollover all the remaining (when a rollover is available), or the
whole claim. In the case where the country is willing to default despite having a positive
income and the Principal wants to prevent it, he has to repurchase some debt of various
maturities to the point the country is able to rollover some of the claim of date t (when a
rollover is available) and willing to repay the rest.
At date 1, knowing the country’s income y1, the Principal can propose to lower the
country’s debt level from (d01, d02) to (d1P1 , d1P2 ) where he repurchases some short-term debt
d01 − d1P1 and/or some long-term debt d02 − d1P2 . He therefore solves:
UP1 = − min{d1P1 ,d1P2 }
{
d01 − d1P1 + δ(d02 − d1P2 ) + δE1
{
x2(d
1
2 − d2P2 ) + (1− x2)φ2
}}
such that:
d01 − d1P1 + δ(d02 − d1P2 ) + δE1
{
x2(d
1
2 − d2P2 ) + (1− x2)φ2
} ≤ φ1 (ICP )
d11 + δE1 (x2d22 + (1− x2)Φ2) ≤ Φ1 (ICC)
d11 ≤ y1 (PCC)
0 ≤ d1Pt ≤ d0t for t = 1, 2 (∗)
The Principal minimizes the net present value of what he decides at date t to repur-
chase (short-term and/or long-term debt if available), what he expects to repurchase as
well in the future and the collateral damage he expects to incur. Constraint (ICP ) is the
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Principal’s incentive constraint guaranteeing that he prefers to participate in the bailout
at date t rather than let the country default. Constraint (ICC) is the country’s incentive
constraint which makes sure that it is willing to repay its debt at date t after the offer of
the Principal (and after a potential rollover) rather than default. Constraint (PCC) guar-
antees that the country can finally pay back its debt at date t, while constraint (∗) ensures
that the Principal can only repurchase debt at date t.3 If there is no solution to the system,
then the Principal does not repurchase any debt and proposes (d1P1 , d1P2 ) = (d01, d02). There
is no bailout at date 1.
Similarly, at date 2, knowing the country’s income y2, the Principal can propose to
repurchase some of the country’s long-term debt and lower it from d12 to d2P2 = d22.4 He
therefore solves:
UP2 = −min{d22}
{
d12 − d22
}
such that:
d12 − d22 ≤ φ2 (ICP )
d22 ≤ Φ2 (ICC)
d22 ≤ y2 (PCC)
0 ≤ d22 ≤ d12 (∗)
Again, if there is no solution to the system, the Principal does not repurchase any debt
and proposes d22 = d12. There is no bailout at date 2.
Rollover decision (Date 1 only). At date 1, after the bailout offer from the Principal,
the country has (d1P1 , d1P2 ) on its portfolio, and can choose to rollover some of its debt to
date 2. Defining d1R2 as the additional amount of debt to repay at date 2 after the rollover,
the country minimizes the net present value of what it expects to pay (debt and/or default
costs):
min
d1R2
{
d11 + δE1(x2d22 + (1− x2)Φ2)
}
3In case the country has zero income at date t, constraint (PCC) is binding. In fact, the Principal
makes sure that after his bailout, the country is able to rollover all the remaining debt and thus avoid
a default. In case the country has a positive income at date t and does not want to rollover and repay
without the help of the Principal, constraint (ICC) is binding. The Principal repurchases some debt to
the point the country is willing to rollover and repay. The Principal’s bailout does not exceed this point
because he is minimizing his own participation.
4There is no rollover as date 2 is the last period of the model.
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such that:
d11 + δE1(x2d22 + (1− x2)Φ2) ≤ Φ1 (ICC)
d11 = d
1P
1 − d
1R
2
1+r12
d12 = d
1P
2 + d
1R
2
where r12 is the one-period interest rate paid by the country at date 1 on debt due at date
2. The marginal utility of borrowing is the same at dates 1 and 2, so the country has an
incentive to rollover some of its debt only if it can prevent a default at date 1. If there is
no solution to the system, then d1R2 = 0 and the country does not rollover any debt5.
Repayment decision. At date 1, the country expects the following utility:
UC1 (R) =
{
y1 − d11 + δE1(y2 − x2d22 − (1− x2)Φ2) if it repays
y1 − Φ1 + δE1(y2) if it defaults
If it did not default at date 1, the country expects the following utility at date 2:
UC2 (R) =
{
y2 − d22 if it repays
y2 − Φ2 if it defaults
Knowing the offer of debt repurchasing made by the Principal, the country decides
whether to rollover some of the renegotiated liability dtPt (when a rollover is available) and
repay the rest, or to default. If the country chooses to default at date t, it defaults on
all its debt due at dates t ≤ τ ≤ 2, incurs the default cost Φt but still has access to its
random incomes in the future. At date t, the country chooses not to default under two
conditions : (i) its utility from repaying is higher than its utility from defaulting and (ii)
it can repay the remaining liability of date t after the rollover (when it is available).
xt = 1⇔
{
UCt (R, xt = 1) ≥ UCt (R, xt = 0)
dtt ≤ yt
5I assume for simplicity that when the country is indifferent between rollover or not its debt, it chooses
not to rollover it, and when it is indifferent between different sizes of rollovers, it chooses the smallest one.
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2.2 The role of the ingredients
In the model, there is a conflict of interests between the country and the Principal :
the country maximizes the Principal’s participation in bailouts in order to extend its
borrowing capacity, whereas the Principal wants the country to reduce its borrowing level
and therefore his own expected involvement.
To understand the role of each assumption in the model, I characterize the first-best
allocation, and study how the optimal allocation evolves as I add one by one the key as-
sumptions of the model. In the following, I denote (d1, d2) = (d01, d02) the initial repayment
levels, UC(R) = UC0 (R) the country’s initial utility and UP = UP0 the Principal’s one for
simplicity. The proofs can be found in Appendix 1.
First, I characterize the first-best borrowing strategy (denoted with a star), ie. the one
that maximizes the country’s utility in the case where the country can commit to repay
its debt, the Principal can commit not to bailout the country, and markets are complete.
Lemma 1 (First-best) 
d∗G1 = y¯1 d
∗GG
2 = y¯2
d∗GB2 = 0
d∗B1 = 0 d
∗BG
2 = y¯2
d∗BB2 = 0

G accounting for the good state at date 1, B for the bad state at date 1, GG for a
succession of two good states at dates 1 and 2, BB of two bad states, GB of a good and a
bad state, and BG of a bad and a good state. It gives initially the following expected utility
to the country and the Principal:
UC∗(R) = Rδ
(
αy¯1 + δ
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2)
UP∗ = 0
As the country’s marginal utility is the highest at date 0 and there is no distortion, the
country optimally chooses to transfer all future incomes to the present, and its maturity
structure is balanced. There is no risk of default, and the Principal does not incur any
bailout or spillover cost.
Second, I characterize the optimal borrowing strategy when the country cannot commit
to repay its debt, but the Principal can commit not to bailout the country and markets
are complete.
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Lemma 2 (Optimal Allocation with country’s lack of commitment)
dG1 = Φ1 − δρdGG2 dGG2 ≤ Φ2
dGB2 = 0
dB1 = δρ(Φ2 − dBG2 ) dBG2 ≤ Φ2
dBB2 = 0

It gives initially the following expected utility to the country and the Principal:
UC(R) = Rδ
(
αΦ1 + δ(1− α)ρΦ2
)
+ δα(y¯1 − Φ1) + δ2
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2 − δ2(1− α)ρΦ2
UP = 0
The country’s utility is reduced compared to the first-best because of its inability to com-
mit to repay its debt. The maturity structure of its portfolio is indeterminate between
short- and long-term debt. The Principal still incurs no bailout or spillover cost.
Third, I characterize the optimal borrowing strategy when the country cannot commit
to repay its debt and the Principal cannot commit not to bailout the country, but markets
are complete.
Lemma 3 (Optimal Allocation with country and Principal’s lack of commitment)
dG1 = φ1 + Φ1 − δρ¯dGG2 − δ(1− ρ)dGB2 0 ≤ dGG2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
0 ≤ dGB2 ≤ φ2
dB1 = φ1 + δρ(Φ2 − dBG2 )− δ(1− ρ)dBB2 Φ2 ≤ dBG2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
0 ≤ dBB2 ≤ φ2

It gives initially the following expected utility to the country and the Principal:
UC(R) = Rδ
(
φ1 + αΦ1 + δ(1− α)ρΦ2
)
+δαy¯1−δαΦ1+δ2
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2−δ2(1−α)ρΦ2
UP = −δφ1
The country is able to expand its level of borrowings as a result of the Principal’s lack
of commitment compared to the previous case. The maturity structure of its portfolio is
indeterminate. However, the Principal’s utility becomes negative as he expects to incur
some bailout and/or spillover costs in the future. In the following, I introduce the key
ingredient of incomplete markets and study the impact of the presence of bailouts on the
choice of maturity structure of the country.
13
3 The Principal’s bailout strategy
In this section, I solve for the optimal bailout strategy of the Principal at dates 1 and
2 by backward induction. At each date, after observing the country’s income, the Prin-
cipal anticipates whether or not it will be willing to default as well as the level of his
bailout/spillover costs. Then, he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of debt repurchasing to
the country if it can reduce his expected participation, i.e. if a bailout costs him less
than a default. Eventually, the country decides whether to accept the offer and repay the
remaining debt, potentially after a rollover, or to default.
A date 2, the Principal’s bailout strategy can involve the repurchasing of long-term
debt d2 only.
Lemma 4 (Date 2, Principal’s bailout strategy) At the beginning of date 2, the country’s
debt structure is characterized by d12.
• In the bad state, the Principal repurchases all the country’s long-term debt if d12 ≤ φ2
and lets it default otherwise.
• In the good state, the country repays its debt without any help if d12 ≤ Φ2. The
Principal repurchases some long-term debt if Φ2 < d12 ≤ Φ2 + φ2 to bring back the
debt level to d2P2 = Φ2 and the country repays. When the debt level exceeds Φ2 + φ2,
the Principal does not repurchase any debt and the country defaults.
At date 1, the Principal can propose to repurchase some of the country’s debt (short-
term, long-term, or both), taking into account the fact that the country can rollover some
of its debt after his offer.
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Lemma 5 (Date 1, Principal’s bailout strategy) At the beginning of date 1, the country’s
debt structure is characterized by {d01, d02}.
• In the bad state, the country rolls over its short-term debt if {d01, d02} is within one of
the Rollover zones. In the Bailout zone, the Principal repurchases some of its short-
term debt to bring down the debt level to the frontier of one of the Rollover zones.
Otherwise, The Principal does not repurchase any debt and the country defaults.
• In the good state, the country repays its debt without any help if {d01, d02} is within
the Reimbursement zone. In the Rollover zones, it rolls over some of its short-
term debt and repays the rest. In the Bailout zone, the Principal repurchases some
of the country’s debt (short-term and/or long-term) to bring down the debt level
either to the frontier of one of the Rollover zones, or directly to the frontier of the
Reimbursement zone. Beyond the Bailout zone, the Principal does not repurchase
any debt and the country defaults.
Rollover zones At date 1, after the bailout offer of the Principal {d1P1 , d1P2 }, the country
has the possibility to rollover some of its short-term debt to avoid a default. In both the
bad and the good state, there are two types of Rollover zones: the Safe and the Risky
ones. In the Safe Rollover zones, the amount of short-term debt to rollover in order to
avoid a default is small enough for the level of long-term debt at the end of date 1 to be
d12 ≤ φ2. In this case, the rollover makes it possible to avoid a default at date 1, while still
guaranteeing that there is no default at date 2. In the Risky Rollover zones, the amount
of short-term debt to rollover in order to avoid a default is larger, so that the level of
long-term debt at the end of date 1 is d12 > φ2. In this case, the rollover makes it possible
to avoid a default at date 1, but there is a potential default at date 2 if the country is in
the bad state.
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Bailout zone At date 2, the Principal can repurchase only long-term debt to prevent a
default, whereas at date 1, he has the choice between repurchasing short-term, long-term
debt, or both. In the two cases, he does so if such a bailout costs him less than a default.
In the following, I study the Bailout zone in both the good and the bad states and char-
acterize what maturity of debt it is optimal to repurchase in each case.
On the one hand, repurchasing long-term debt is characterized by a commitment effect :
the Principal commits to a bailout tomorrow, so that the country accepts to rollover and
repay its debt today, knowing that it cannot default tomorrow. In fact, such a bailout
alleviates the country’s incentive constraints both today and tomorrow, and prevents a
default at the two maturities. There are two channels at work for the country: a debt
price channel which reduces the cost of a rollover, and a debt level channel which de-
creases directly the net present value of the repayments. On the other hand, repurchasing
short-term debt is characterized by an option value effect : the Principal repurchases only
short-term debt today such that the country accepts to rollover and repay the rest. Such
a bailout prevents a default today through a debt level channel uniquely, without trying
to affect the potential outcomes tomorrow.
More precisely, in the bad state, the country cannot repay any debt. In the Bailout
zone, the Principal finds it optimal to repurchase short-term debt to prevent a default at
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date 1 only. In fact, as the Principal minimizes the cost of his bailout, he repurchases
debt to reach the frontier of the Risky Rollover zone. It would be more costly to reach
the frontier of the Safe Rollover zone and prevent a default at date 2 as well, because
the implied cost of repurchasing additional short-term and long-term debt (in some cases)
outweighs the benefit from preventing a default at date 2. Furthermore, a bailout involving
short-term debt is optimal, because the amount of short-term debt to repurchase in order
to reach the frontier of the Risky Rollover zone is lower than the amount of long-term
debt that would be required to attain the same objective. Hence, the option value effect
dominates.
In the good state, the country’s overall debt level is so high that it would rather default
today, even though it would have been able to repay the maturing claim. The Bailout
zone can be divided into three zones: A, B and C (separated by red dotted lines in the
graph). In zone A, there is no risk of default tomorrow, so that the Principal is indifferent
between repurchasing short-term or long-term debt to bring back debt to the frontier of
the Safe Rollover zone. In zones B and C, a default can happen tomorrow if the country
is in the bad state. In zone B, the gain from repurchasing long-term debt to reach the
frontier of either the Rollover zone or the Reimbursement zone and prevent a default at
both dates outweighs the gain from repurchasing short-term debt and prevent a default at
date 1 only. Hence, repurchasing long-term debt is strictly optimal and the commitment
effect dominates. In zone C, repurchasing short-term debt to reach the frontier of the
Risky Rollover zone and prevent a default at date 1 only is less costly than repurchasing
long-term debt to attain the same objective. It is also less costly than repurchasing addi-
tional debt to prevent a default at date 2 as well. Hence, repurchasing short-term debt is
strictly optimal and the option value effect dominates.
The next Proposition summarizes the optimal bailout strategy for the Principal and
the tradeoff between long-term and short-term debt repurchasing.
Proposition 1 (Principal’s bailout strategy)
• Repurchasing long-term debt in the Bailout zone is strictly optimal when a commit-
ment effect dominates: by committing to a bailout tomorrow, the Principal makes the
country repay today (backloading result), and prevents a default at the two maturities.
• Otherwise, repurchasing short-term debt is optimal and the "option value effect"
dominates. It prevents a default today, without trying to affect the potential outcomes
tomorrow.
17
The proof can be found in Appendix 2. Intuitively, repurchasing long-term debt alle-
viates the country’s incentive constraints through two channels: a reduction in the level
of debt and an increase in debt prices that helps the country rollover its debt at date 1.
On the contrary, repurchasing short-term debt impacts the country through a reduction
in the level of debt only.
4 The country’s optimal borrowing strategy
In this section, I solve for the optimal borrowing strategy of the country at date 0, in-
ternalizing both the Principal’s bailout strategies and the country’s rollover and default
decisions at dates 1 and 2. I am therefore able to solve simultaneously for the initial
borrowing level b0 and the interest rates paid on debt r01 and r02.
At date 0, the country can choose a debt level {d01, d02} lying into 4 possible zones (See
Figure 3).
Figure 3: Summary of borrowing strategies
• In the NN zone, the country never defaults: at date 1, it repays its debt in the good
state and rolls it over in the bad state. At date 2, it repays in the good state and is
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bailed out by the Principal in the bad state.
• In the ND zone, there is no default at date 1 but a potential default at date 2: at
date 1, the country repays its debt in the good state and rolls it over after a potential
bailout from the Principal in the bad state. At date 2, it repays after a potential
bailout from the Principal in the good state, but defaults in the bad state.
• In the DN zone, there is a potential default at date 1 but no default at date 2: at
date 1, the country repays its debt after a potential rollover and/or bailout from the
Principal in the good state, but defaults in the bad state. At date 2, provided that
the country did not default at date 1, it repays in the good state and is bailed out
by the Principal in the bad state.
• In the DD zone, there is a potential default at both dates: at date 1, the country
repays its debt after a potential rollover and/or bailout from the Principal in the
good state, but defaults in the bad state. At date 2, provided that the country did
not default at date 1, the country repays after a potential bailout from the Principal
in the good state, but defaults in the bad state.
Beyond these 4 zones, the country defaults with certainty at one period at least, so that
interest rates are infinite. It cannot happen at the equilibrium.
Within each borrowing zone, the interest rates paid on debt at both maturities are
determined by default probabilities. Then, the optimal borrowing strategy of the country
is a function of its liquidity need R. In the following, I denote (di1, di2) = (d01, d02) the initial
repayment levels for a given borrowing strategy i. The next Lemma whose proof can be
found in Appendix 2 summarizes the results.
Lemma 6 (Country’s borrowing strategy)
• In the low liquidity need zone (1 ≤ R < R1), the country chooses the "Low strategy"
within the NN zone by borrowing a small amount of long-term debt:{
dL1 = 0
dL2 = φ2
• In the intermediate liquidity need zone (R1 ≤ R < R2), the country chooses the
"Intermediate strategy" within the ND zone by additionally borrowing some short-
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term debt: {
dI1 = φ1 + δρΦ2 − δφ2
dI2 = φ2
• In the high liquidity need zone (R ≥ R2), the country chooses the "High strategy"
within the DN zone by borrowing an even larger amount of short-term debt:{
dH1 = φ1 + Φ1 − δdR,ST2
dH2 ≤ φ1δ + ρφ2
Figure 4: Country’s borrowing strategy (1/2)
Figure 5: Country’s borrowing strategy (2/2)
Figure 4 summarizes the choice of borrowing strategy as a function of the liquidity
need R, while Figure 5 represents the borrowing strategies in the space of short-term and
long-term debt repayments. In the low liquidity need zone, the country chooses to borrow
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long-term debt only, such that there is no default at date 2. Indeed, it repays its debt
in the good state of date 2 and is bailed out by the Principal in the bad state. In the
intermediate liquidity need zone, it additionally borrows some short-term debt and takes
a risk of default at date 2. At date 1, it repays its debt in the good state and rolls it over
after a bailout from the principal in the bad state. At date 2, it repays after a bailout
from the Principal in the good state, but defaults in the bad state. In the high liquidity
need zone, it borrows short-term debt further and takes a risk of default at date 1. At
date 1, it repays after both a bailout from the Principal and a rollover of some of its debt
in the good state, but defaults in the bad state. At date 2, provided that the country did
not default at date 1, it repays in the good state and is bailed out by the Principal in the
bad state.
Borrowing level evolution Defining bi as the initial level of borrowing for i = {L, I,H},
I find that the level of borrowings increases with the liquidity need, as the country switches
from the Low to the Intermediate and High strategies. The same can be observed for the
level of repayments (see Figure 5).
• In the low liquidity need zone, the country chooses a low level of borrowings:
bL = δ
2φ2
• In the intermediate liquidity need zone, the country increases its level of borrowings
and takes a risk of default at date 2:
bI = δ(φ1 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− α)(1− ρ)φ2)
• In the high liquidity need zone, the country increases further its level of borrowings
and takes a risk of default at date 1:
bH = δα(φ1 + Φ1)
Maturity evolution Defining βi =
d01
d01+d
0
2
as the ratio of short-term repayments over
total repayments for i = {L, I,H}, I find that the maturity of the country’s portfolio
shortens when its liquidity need rises, as the country switches from the Low to the Inter-
mediate and High strategies (see Figure 6).
• In the low liquidity need zone, the country optimally chooses to borrow only long-
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term debt:
βL = 0
The Principal’s help is exclusively concentrated on the long-term maturity.
• In the intermediate liquidity need zone, the country additionally borrows some short-
term debt so that the composition of its portfolio is balanced (under realistic assump-
tions about the parameters6):
βI =
φ1 + δρΦ2 − δφ2
φ1 + δρΦ2 + (1− δ)φ2
The Principal’s help is shared evenly across the two maturities, so that the country
may benefit from repeated bailouts.
• In the high liquidity need zone, the country relies almost exclusively on short-term
debt:
Φ1 − δρφ2
Φ1 +
φ1
δ
+ (1− δ)ρφ2
≤ βH ≤ 1
Most of the Principal’s help is concentrated on the short-term maturity.
Intuitively, the country can credibly commit to repay more debt on the short maturity
than on the long one, as there is less uncertainty about future outcomes in the short-term
than in the long-term. In a situation of high liquidity need, borrowing mostly short-term
debt and concentrating the Principal’s help on this maturity is therefore a way for the
sovereign to maximize its initial borrowing capacity at the expense of recurrent default
risks. On the contrary, when its liquidity need is lower, the country chooses a more bal-
anced portfolio and shares the Principal’s help across the two maturities, or even shifts
it completely towards long-term debt along with the Principal’s help. Then, it is able to
moderate or even eliminate default risks.
The respective benefits of short- and long-term debt Performing a counterfactual
analysis where the country has access to long-term debt only, I find that, in a situation
of high liquidity need, its borrowing capacity as well as its initial expected utility are re-
duced compared to the benchmark model. On the contrary, when the country has access
to short-term debt only, it reaches the same level of borrowing capacity and of initial
expected utility (see Appendix 3 for more details).
6There are more details in the appendices.
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Figure 6: Maturity Evolution
As the country cannot commit to reimburse more than what it will be willing to repay,
borrowing at two maturities instead of one can only expand the set of borrowing possi-
bilities. Eventually, it is clear that short-term debt has a borrowing capacity advantage
compared to long-term debt when the liquidity need is high, which explains the extensive
use of short-term debt in this situation.
5 The impact of the presence of potential bailouts
In this section, I investigate the impact of the presence of potential bailouts on the coun-
try’s borrowing strategy by comparing the benchmark model with the extreme case where
φ1 = φ2 = 0, i.e. there is no bailout from the Principal.
In a setup without potential bailout, the country is able to repay a positive amount of
debt at a given maturity in the good state only. In this case, the only strategy with no
risk of default at both dates is composed of no debt. All other strategies with a positive
amount of debt are strategies with a potential default7.
7The only instrument that the country can use to avoid a default at a given period is to rollover its
debt (available only at date 1), but it makes a default possible in the following period to which the debt
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Defining RN as the threshold of liquidity need in this setup (N accounting for No
potential bailout), the next Lemma whose proof can be found in Appendix 4 summarizes
the country’s optimal borrowing strategy:
Lemma 7 (Country’s borrowing strategy without potential bailout)
• When 1 ≤ R < RN , the country chooses a "Low strategy" with no debt:{
dN,L1 = 0
dN,L2 = 0
There is no default at both dates.
• When R ≥ RN , the country chooses a "High strategy" with only short-term debt:{
dN,H1 = Φ1
dN,H2 = 0
There is a potential default at date 1 if the country receives no income, but none at
date 2.
First, the borrowing level of the country is reduced when there is no potential bailout.
In fact, the Low strategy consists of no debt, while the High strategy consists of short-term
debt only. When there are potential bailouts, the Low strategy allows the country to take
a positive level of debt on the long-term maturity, while the High strategy enables the
country to borrow more on the short-term maturity (and on the long-term maturity as
well in some cases). As in the benchmark model, as the liquidity need rises, the country
issues more short-term debt and takes risks of default.
Second, comparing the liquidity need threshold RN without potential bailout with the
ones in the benchmark model with potential bailouts, they rank as follows:
R1 < RN < R2
The set of liquidity needs where the country relies on short-term debt and takes risks of
default is larger when there are potential bailouts. Hence, the country uses more short-
term debt and takes more risks on average.
is rolled over.
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Figure 7: Comparison with/without potential bailouts
Third, the respective nature of long-term and short-term debt can be distinguished.
Short-term debt enables the country to raise more money initially, but generates a risk of
default at date 1. On the contrary, long-term debt does not allow the country to raise as
much money initially, while still generating a risk of default at date 2. Hence, short-term
debt always dominates long-term debt when the liquidity need is high, and long-term debt
is not used at the equilibrium in this setup.
Note that at the equilibrium, it is never optimal for the country to raise a positive level of
debt at both maturities. In particular, sharing debt between the two maturities is always
dominated by raising only short term debt. In fact, the incentive compatibility constraint
that insures repayment at date 1 is tighter when there is some debt at date 2, and the
resulting decrease in the ability to borrow at date 1 is not compensated by the increase in
borrowings of date 2. Intuitively, the country takes more risk and is able to borrow less
when debt is allocated across the two maturities.
Eventually, the lack of commitment of the Principal affects directly his expected utility, as
he expects to incur more bailout/spillover costs. This is the case for any level of liquidity
needs R, as the country optimally takes advantage of as much help as possible from the
Principal. The next Proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 2 (The impact of the presence of potential bailouts)
The presence of potential bailouts raises the country’s borrowing capacity and makes
it rely more on short-term debt on average. As short-term debt is associated with debt
rollover risk, there are more default risks on average.
6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I study the ex post welfare of the country and the Principal in the bench-
mark model with potential bailouts, and study how it could be improved ex ante.
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6.1 Ex Post Welfare
First, the Principal’s welfare is zero at its maximum and negative when he anticipates
bailout and/or spillover costs. Furthermore, it does not depend on the level of the liquidity
need R, but only on the country’s choice of borrowing strategy. If the High strategy is
chosen, the Principal expects the lowest possible utility UPH . If the Intermediate strategy
is chosen, the Principal expects a higher utility UPI . The highest utility he can expect is
under the Low strategy, UPL .
Second, the country’s welfare depends on both its level of liquidity need R and its choice
of borrowing strategy. More precisely, the Low strategy brings a higher level of utility
to the country when R is below the threshold R1, the Intermediate strategy is preferable
when R is between R1 and R2, and the High strategy when R is above R2.
From the point of view of the Principal, it would be preferable that the country chooses the
Low or the Intermediate strategy even in situations of high liquidity needs (see Appendix
5).
6.2 Ex Ante Policies
In this subsection, I am looking for ex ante policies that could improve total welfare in the
benchmark model. I follow two different approaches: in the first, I exhibit a regulatory
instrument (a maturity limit ratio imposing β ≤ β, a fixed threshold) and let the country
choose its optimal borrowing strategy. In the second, I design a contractual agreement
that both the country and the Principal are willing to take out initially. The proofs are
in Appendix 6.
Regulatory instrument The combination of a maturity limit ratio with an initial
transfer to compensate the country can contain the country’s risk-taking behavior, but
cannot improve total welfare (see Figure 8). In fact, it reduces the Principal’s expected
participation in bailout/spillover costs, but the cost of the transfer to compensate the
country for a reduced borrowing capacity is larger.
Let us take the example of the following limit β, defined by the maturity ratio of the
Intermediate strategy:
β ≤ β = φ1 + δρΦ2 − δφ2
φ1 + δρ+ (1− δ)φ2
When the liquidity need is low, the country optimally chooses the Low strategy which
is allowed by the maturity limit ratio. In this case, a positive transfer is not necessary
because the Principal’s utility is already maximized: UCML,L(R) = UCL (R) (ML accounting
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Figure 8: Ex-Ante Policy
for Maturity Limit ratio).
T (R) = 0 ∀R < R1
When the liquidity need is intermediate, the country chooses the Intermediate strategy
with a larger share of short-term debt which is also allowed by the maturity limit ra-
tio. Again, a positive transfer is not necessary, because the country’s utility is already
maximized: UCML,I(R) = UCI (R).
T (R) = 0 ∀R1 ≤ R < R2
When the liquidity need is high, the country wants to choose the High strategy with a large
share of short-term debt, but it is not allowed by the maturity limit ratio. Below the limit
ratio, the country optimally chooses the Intermediate strategy, whose maturity structure is
more balanced. On the one hand, the Principal’s expected utility is improved compared to
the High strategy UPI −UPH = δφ1−δ2(1−αρ)φ2 > 0, so that the Principal is strictly better
off. On the other hand, the country’s utility is reduced to UCML,I(R) = UCI (R) < UCH (R)
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and a positive transfer is necessary to compensate it:
T (R) =
UCH (R)− UCI (R)
R
∀R ≥ R2
Yet, the cost of the transfer is strictly larger than the gain in the Principal’s expected
utility. Hence, this regulatory policy is not welfare-improving.
Intuitively, a limit on the ratio of short-term debt-to-total debt that the country can have
on its portfolio contains its risk-taking behavior, because of the strong link between short-
term debt and risks of default. Yet, it cannot improve total welfare because it does not
address the contradictory incentives of the country and the Principal. It is indeed always
optimal for the country to obtain the largest participation possible from the Principal in
order to increase its initial borrowing capacity. Hence, a limit on the maturity structure
cannot alleviate this incentive, but only delay its impact on default risk to date 2.
Contractual agreement A contractual agreement between the country and the Prin-
cipal can improve total welfare.
More precisely, suppose that at the beginning of date 0, the Principal anticipates which
borrowing strategy the country is willing to choose (Low, Intermediate, or High) and can
make a contractual offer to the country. If the country turns down the offer, the outcome
is the one studied in the benchmark model.
The contractual offer is composed of borrowings from both the market and the Principal.
On the one hand, bonds sold in the financial market have the same characteristics than
in the benchmark model. On the other hand, the Principal offers loans on competitive
terms, but can make the repayments contingent on the state of nature.
In the contractual offer, if the country were to adopt the Low strategy with the mar-
ket for any level of liquidity needs, it would reduce the Principal’s expected participation
in bailout and/or spillover costs. To make this incentive-compatible for the country, the
Principal has to lend to the country on top of the market. Furthermore, the Principal
designs the contract to guarantee that (i) the country is willing to repay its debt to both
the market and the Principal in the good states of nature8 and that (ii) he is willing to
repurchase the country’s debt to the market in bad ones. Hence, the country never defaults.
There are two important elements: first, the Principal lends on top of the market in
order to prevent the country from borrowing too much from the market and to risk a de-
8In this setup, the country incurs a default cost whenever it does not repay one of its claim. Hence,
the country always considers either to repay everybody (the market and the Principal) or nobody. There
is no issue of seniority.
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fault. Second, reimbursements to the Principal are contingent on the realization of good
states of nature. It can be understood as guarantors acting as "lenders in last resort" and
willing to forgive some of their claims if necessary9.
Using a mechanism design approach, the contract specifies:
• A borrowing level b and its allocation between the market and the Principal:
b = bM + bP
• Debt repayments to be made to the market and the Principal: (dM1 , dM2 , dP1 , dP2 ) where
(dM1 , d
M
2 ) are the amounts of non-contingent debt to be reimbursed to the market at
dates 1 and 2 (with bM = δdM1 + δ2dM2 ), and (dP1 , dP2 ) the amounts of contingent debt
to be reimbursed to the Principal only if the good state is realized at dates 1 and 2
(with bP = δαdP1 + δ2(αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ)dP2 ).
Let us study the case where bM is defined by the level of debt of the Low strategy10. If
the country is initially willing to choose the Low strategy, the contract includes only bor-
rowings bM from the market. If the country is initially willing to choose the Intermediate
or the High strategy, the contract includes borrowings from the market bM as well as from
the Principal bP . The Principal designs bP to make the contract incentive-compatible for
the country and to allow it to reach the same level of utility it would have obtained outside
of the contract.
Under such a contract, the Principal reduces his participation in bailout/spillover costs.
When the liquidity need is low, his expected utility is the one of the Low strategy. When
the liquidity need is higher, as he exactly breaks even under his own lending at date 0, his
expected utility is again the one of the Low strategy. Furthermore, the country expects
the same utility that it would have obtained outside of the contract. Thus, the Principal
is better off under the optimal contract, while the country is as well off. It is therefore
Pareto-improving.
Proposition 3 (Contractual agreement).
9Note that if the country could borrow from the Principal only, it would have access to fully contingent
debt and would be able to extend its borrowing capacity compared to the borrowing strategies of the
benchmark model.
10Note that there is no potential default in this situation, because the country is willing to repay its
debt to the market in the good state of date 2 and the Principal repurchases it in the bad state.
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• If the country is to take initially the Low strategy, then the contactual offer is:{
bM = δ2φ2
bP = 0
• If the country is to take initially the Intermediate or the High strategy, then a con-
tractual offer is: {
bM = δ2φ2
bP = δαdP1 + δ
2(αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ)dP2
(dP1 , d
P
2 ) being defined to make the offer incentive-compatible for the country.
The Pareto-improvement comes from addressing the divergence of interests between
the country and the Principal. First, the Intermediate and High strategies enable the
country to extend its initial borrowing capacity, but generate at the same time risks of
default for the country and collateral damage for the Principal. Second, adopting the
Low strategy with no default limits the initial borrowing capacity, whereas the country
could commit to reimburse more in the good state of nature. In this situation, contingent
borrowing from the Principal on top of the market alleviates these inefficiencies.
To conclude, the Principal prefers the country to take the Low strategy with no default
at both dates in order to reduce his participation in bailout and/or spillover costs. Under
the assumption that the Principal can lend to the country on top of the market and make
his claims contingent on the state of nature, he can design a contract where everybody is
better off (at least weakly).
7 Conclusion
The paper highlights the mechanisms behind the choice of maturity structure of a sovereign
that internalizes potential bailouts from guarantors. The presence of potential bailouts
extends the initial borrowing capacity of the country and makes it rely more on short-
term debt on average. Intuitively, when the country is faced with a high liquidity need, it
chooses to rely mostly on short-term debt and is able to concentrate the help of guarantors
on the short-term, which is the maturity that enables the country to raise initially as much
debt as possible. As short-term debt is associated with debt rollover risk, this generates
more default risk on average.
When guarantors decide to bailout the country and there is also a potential default in
the future that is not too costly to prevent, the optimal bailout involves the repurchasing
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of long-term debt. Hence, guarantors achieve two goals at the same time, prevent a default
both today and tomorrow. Otherwise, the optimal bailout involves the repurchasing of
short-term debt only, and prevents a default only today.
Based on the welfare analysis, some policy implications can be derived. First, the in-
tervention of potential guarantors when a country starts having troubles can prevent the
adoption of risky borrowing strategies (with potential defaults). More concretely, this ar-
ticle gives a rationale for the intervention of the IMF or the Eurozone. Indeed, guarantors
can design a contract where they lend some money to the troubled country at different
terms than those proposed by the financial market11. Such a contract is welfare-improving
and prevents the occurrence of any default at the equilibrium. Second, regulating the ma-
turity of debt issuance in order to guarantee that the country’s portfolio remains balanced
is able to contain the risk-taking behavior of the country, but is not Pareto-improving.
In fact, such a policy does not address the fundamental issue of the setup, which is the
divergence of interests between the country and the guarantors.
The paper opens a lot of alleys for further research. In the model, I assume perfect
information on the cost of default and on the endowment level. The country, when de-
ciding which borrowing strategy to adopt, anticipates exactly when and by how much
guarantors will bail it out. In the Eurozone for example, the country forms expectations
about potential bailouts, as there is no formal joint-and-several liability agreement. It is
the same issue for guarantors when they decide to bailout a country: they do not know
exactly the default cost of the country and have to form expectations about it. It would
be interesting to introduce some moral hazard where guarantors form beliefs about the
country’s health (based on the maturity choice of the country for example) and study how
this would affect the behavior of both the country and guarantors.
11Note that this supposes some coordination among guarantors.
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Appendix 1: First step Analyses
Lemma 1 (First-best). Given the fact that R ≥ 1, the marginal utility of borrowing is
the highest at date 0, compared to dates 1 and 2. Thus, the optimal borrowing strategy
is to transfer all future incomes to the present. The first-best is therefore:
d∗G1 = y¯1 d
∗GG
2 = y¯2
d∗GB2 = 0
d∗B1 = 0 d
∗BG
2 = y¯2
d∗BB2 = 0

It gives initially the following expected utility to the country and the Principal:
UC∗(R) = Rδ
(
αy¯1 + δ
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2)
UP∗ = 0
Lemma 2 (Optimal allocation with country’s lack of commitment). The country solves
the following problem, under additional incentive constraints for the country (denoted by
ICC) and rollover constraints (denoted by ROC)12:
max
d0G1 ,d
0B
1 ,d
0GG
2 ,d
0BG
2
{
Rδ
(
αd0G1 + (1− α)d0B1 + δαρd0GG2 + δ(1− α)ρd0BG2
)
+ δα(y1 − d1G1 )
+δ2(αρ+ (1− α)ρ)y2 − δ2αρd1GG2 − δ2(1− α)ρd1BG2
}
such that:
d1G1 + δρd
1GG
2 ≤ Φ1 (ICCG)
d1iG2 ≤ Φ2 (ICCiG) for i = B,G
d1G1 = d
0G
1 − δρd1GR2 (ROCG)
d1iG2 = d
0iG
2 + d
1iR
2 (RO
C
iG) for i = B,G
d0B1 = δρd
1BR
2 (RO
C
B)
There is a continuum of solutions:
12Notice that the country cannot commit to repay anything in the bad states of date 2, so that d0GB2 =
d0BB2 = 0
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
dG1 = Φ1 − δρdGG2 dGG2 ≤ Φ2
dGB2 = 0
dB1 = δρ(Φ2 − dBG2 ) dBG2 ≤ Φ2
dBB2 = 0

It gives initially the following expected utility to the country and the Principal:
UC(R) = Rδ
(
αΦ1 + δ(1− α)ρΦ2
)
+ δα(y¯1 − Φ1) + δ2
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2 − δ2(1− α)ρΦ2
UP = 0
Lemma 3 (Optimal allocation with country and Principal’s lack of commitment).
max
d0G1 ,d
0B
1 ,d
0GG
2 ,d
0GB
2 ,d
0BG
2 ,d
0BB
2
{
Rδ
(
αd0G1 + (1− α)d0B1 + δαρd0GG2 + δα(1− ρ)d0GB2 + δ(1− α)ρd0BG2
+δ(1− α)(1− ρ)d0BB2
)
+ δα(y1 − d1G1 ) + δ2(αρ+ (1− α)ρ)y2 − δ2αρd2GG2 − δ2(1− α)ρd2BG2
}
such that:
d1G1 = d
1GP
1 − δρd1GGR2 − δ(1− ρ)d1GBR2 (ROCG)
d1Gi2 = d
1GiP
2 + d
1GiR
2 (RO
C
Gi) for i = B,G
d1BP1 = δρd
1BR
2 + δ(1− ρ)d1BBR2 (ROCB)
d1Bi2 = d
1BiP
2 + d
1BiR
2 (RO
C
Bi) for i = B,G
d1G1 + δρd
2GG
2 ≤ Φ1 (ICCG)
d2iG2 ≤ Φ2 (ICCiG) for i = B,G
d0G1 − d1GP1 + δρ(d0GG2 − d1GGP2 ) + δρ(d1GG2 − d2GG2 )
+δ(1− ρ)(d0GB2 − d1GBP2 ) + δ(1− ρ)d1GB2 ≤ φ1 (ICPG)
d0B1 − d1BP1 + δρ(d0BG2 − d1BGP2 ) + δρ(d1BG2 − d2BG2 )
+δ(1− ρ)(d0BB2 − d1BBP2 ) + δ(1− ρ)d1BB2 ≤ φ1 (ICPB )
d1iG2 − d2iG2 ≤ φ2 (ICPiG) for i = B,G
d1iB2 ≤ φ2 (ICPiB) for i = B,G
There is a continuum of solutions:
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
dG1 = φ1 + Φ1 − δρ¯dGG2 − δ(1− ρ)dGB2 0 ≤ dGG2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
0 ≤ dGB2 ≤ φ2
dB1 = φ1 + δρ(Φ2 − dBG2 )− δ(1− ρ)dBB2 Φ2 ≤ dBG2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
0 ≤ dBB2 ≤ φ2

It gives initially the following expected utility to the country and the Principal:
UC(R) = Rδ
(
φ1 + αΦ1 + δ(1− α)ρΦ2
)
+δα(y¯1−δαΦ1+δ2
(
αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ) y¯2−δ2(1−α)ρΦ2
UP = −δφ1
Appendix 2: The Model
Date 2 At the beginning of date 2, the country’s debt is characterized by d12.
First case: zero income at date 2
The Principal’s bailout strategy: If the country has a zero income y2 = 0 at date 2,
it cannot repay its debt and chooses to default as long as d22 > 0. Thus, the Principal has
to repurchase its whole debt by offering d22 = 0 if he wants to prevent a default. He does
so only if a bailout costs less than letting the country default (Bailout zone).
Lemma 4.1 (Date 2, zero income) The Principal’s optimal bailout strategy is:
• If d12 ≤ φ2, the Principal converts d12 to d22 = 0 and the country does not default.
• If d12 > φ2, the Principal does not repurchase any debt and the country defaults.
Second case: positive income at date 2
The Principal’s bailout strategy: If the country has a positive income y2 = y¯2 at
date 2, it is willing to pay back its debt when d22 ≤ Φ2. Thus, when d12 ≤ Φ2, the Principal
knows that the country will repay and does not intervene (Reimbursement zone). When
d12 > Φ2, the Principal has to repurchase some of the debt if he wants to prevent a default
by offering optimally d22 = Φ2 which is the point where the country is willing to pay back
its debt and costs the least to the Principal. The Principal does so only if such a bailout
costs less than letting the country default (Bailout zone).
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Lemma 4.2 (Date 2, positive income) The Principal’s optimal bailout strategy is:
• If d12 ≤ Φ2, the Principal needs not repurchase any debt and d22 = d12. The country
repays d22 and there is no default.
• If Φ2 < d12 ≤ Φ2 + φ2, the Principal offers to repurchase d12 − Φ2 ≤ φ2 and sets
d22 = Φ2. The country repays d22 = Φ2 and there is no default.
• If d12 > Φ2 +φ2, the Principal does not repurchase any debt and d22 = d12. The country
defaults at the equilibrium13.
Date 1 At the beginning of date 1, the country’s debt is characterized by (d01, d02).
First case: zero income at date 1
If the country has a zero income y1 = 0 at date 1, it cannot repay its debt, and chooses
to default as long as d11 > 0. Thus, the Principal can propose to repurchase some of the
country’s debt (d01−d1P1 , d02−d1P2 ), and the country can decide to rollover some of its debt
to the next period d1R2 . After both the bailout from the Principal and the rollover, the
remaining debt at date 1 must be d11 = 0 if a default is to be prevented.
The Sovereign’s rollover strategy: After a bailout from the Principal, the country’s
remaining debt is (d1P1 , d1P2 ). As long as d1P1 > 0, the country needs to rollover all the
remaining short-term debt if it wants to avoid a default14. Let us solve for the optimal
rollover strategy by differentiating the cases according to the level of d1P2 :
• When 0 ≤ d1P2 ≤ φ2 and
– 0 ≤ d1P1 ≤ δ(φ2 − d1P2 ), the country is able to rollover debt such that the final
level of long-term debt d12 = d1P2 + d1R2 ≤ φ2 with d1P1 = δd1R2 .
– δ(φ2 − d1P2 ) ≤ d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d1P2 ), the country is able to rollover debt
such that the final level of long-term debt d12 = d1P2 + d1R2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2 with
d1P1 = δρd
1R
2 .
– d1P1 > δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d1P2 ), the level of short-term debt to rollover in order to
avoid a default is too large, and there is no rollover.
13Notice that this case cannot happen at the equilibrium, as the country defaults with certainty at date
2. Thus, no lender agrees initially to sell long-term debt above the limit Φ2 + φ2.
14The marginal utility of consumption being the same between dates 1 and 2, the country has no
incentive to borrow more than what is required to avoid a default at date 1.
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• When φ2 ≤ d1P2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2 and
– 0 ≤ d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2− d1P2 ), the country is able to rollover debt such that the
final level of long-term debt d12 = d1P2 + d1R2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2 with d1P1 = δρd1R2 .
– d1P1 > δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d1P2 ), the level of short-term debt to rollover in order to
avoid a default is too large, and there is no rollover.
The Principal’s bailout strategy: The sovereign enters the period with debt levels
(d01, d
0
2). Taking into account the fact that the sovereign can rollover some of its debt
after his bailout offer, the Principal can propose to repurchase some of the country’s debt
(d01− d1P1 , d02− d1P2 ) to prevent a default at date 1. He does so only if the sovereign cannot
rollover enough debt to avoid a default, and if he can find a bailout offer (d1P1 , d1P2 ) that
costs him less to than to let the sovereign default. Let us solve for the optimal bailout
strategy by differentiating the cases according to the level of d02:
• When d02 ≤ φ2: if d01 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the country can rollover all its short-term
debt and avoid a default at date 1. There is no need for the Principal to intervene.
Yet, if d01 > δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the Principal can propose to repurchase some of the
debt of the country if he wants to prevent a default at date 1. In this case, he has
to bring back debt levels to (d1P1 , d1P2 ) such that d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d1P2 ). He has
three possibilities: repurchase debt such that the final level of long-term debt (after
the rollover decision of the country) is (1) Φ2 < d12 = d1P2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, (2)
φ2 < d
1
2 = d
1P
2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2, or eventually (3) d12 = d1P2 + d
1P
1
δ
≤ φ2. In the three cases,
the Principal solves:
min
d1P1 ,d
1P
2
{
d01 − d1P1 + δ(d02 − d1P2 ) + δE1
{
x2(d
1
2 − d2P2 ) + (1− x2)φ2
}}
such that the overall expected cost is lower than his spillover cost φ1, d12 is in the
defined range, and he cannot repurchase more debt than the country has on its
portfolio. Eventually, the cost incurred by the Principal is the lowest in case (1),
and involves the largest bailout zone. Thus, within the set δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02) <
d01 ≤ φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1 − ρ)φ2, the Principal makes a bailout offer (d1P1 =
δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 = d02) and the country does not default at date 115.
15I assume that the Principal makes the minimal bailout offer to the country. More precisely, he is
indifferent between all the following bailouts: (δρ(Φ2 − d02) < d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 ≤ d02). In this
set, it amounts the same to the Principal to repurchase more short-term debt today (implying that the
country has less debt to rollover), or to repurchase more debt tomorrow.
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• When φ2 < d02 ≤ Φ2: if d01 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the country can rollover all its
short-term debt and avoid a default at date 1. There is no need for the Principal
to intervene. Yet, if d01 > δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the Principal can propose to repurchase
some of the debt of the country if he wants to prevent a default at date 1. In this
case, he has to bring back debt levels to (d1P1 , d1P2 ) such that d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 +φ2−d1P2 ).
He has three possibilities: repurchase debt such that the final level of long-term debt
(after the rollover decision of the country) is (1) Φ2 < d12 = d1P2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, (2)
φ2 < d
1
2 = d
1P
2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2, or eventually (3) d12 = d1P2 + d
1P
1
δ
≤ φ2. In the three cases,
the Principal solves the same problem as before. Eventually, the cost incurred by
the Principal is the lowest in case (1), and involves the largest bailout zone. Thus,
within the set δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− ρ)φ2, the Principal
makes a bailout offer (d1P1 = δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 = d02) and the country does not
default at date 1.
• When Φ2 < d02 ≤ Φ2 + φ2: if d01 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the country can rollover all its
short-term debt and avoid a default at date 1. There is no need for the Principal
to intervene. Yet, if d01 > δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the Principal can propose to repurchase
some of the debt of the country if he wants to prevent a default at date 1. In this
case, he has to bring back debt levels to (d1P1 , d1P2 ) such that d1P1 ≤ δρ(Φ2 +φ2−d1P2 ).
He has three possibilities: repurchase debt such that the final level of long-term debt
(after the rollover decision of the country) is (1) Φ2 < d12 = d1P2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, (2)
φ2 < d
1
2 = d
1P
2 +
d1P1
δρ
≤ Φ2, or eventually (3) d12 = d1P2 + d
1P
1
δ
≤ φ2. In the three cases,
the Principal solves the same problem as before. Eventually, the cost incurred by
the Principal is the lowest in case (1), and involves the largest bailout zone. Thus,
within the set δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− ρ)φ2, the Principal
makes a bailout offer (d1P1 = δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 = d02) and the country does not
default at date 1.
Lemma 4.3 (Date 1, Zero income)
0 ≤ d02 ≤ φ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ δ(φ2 − d02), the country is able to rollover its debt such that the level of
long-term debt is eventually d12 = d02 +
d01
δ
≤ φ2, and the Principal does not intervene.
There is no default at date 1.
• If δ(φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the country is able to rollover its debt such
that the level of long-term debt is eventually Φ2 < d12 = d02 +
d01
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, and the
Principal does not intervene. There is no default at date 1.
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• If δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1 − ρ)φ2, the Principal proposes
to repurchase some of the short-term debt of the country to bring back debt levels
to (d1P1 = δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 = d02). After the bailout, the country rolls over the
remaining debt and d12 = Φ2 + φ2. There is no default at date 1.
• If d01 > φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− ρ)φ2, the Principal does not intervene, there is too
much debt to rollover, and the country defaults at date 1.
φ2 < d
0
2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), the country is able to rollover its debt such that the
level of long-term debt is eventually Φ2 < d12 = d02 +
d01
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, and the Principal
does not intervene. There is no default at date 1.
• If δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1 − ρ)φ2, the Principal proposes
to repurchase some of the short-term debt of the country to bring back debt levels
to (d1P1 = δρ(Φ2 + φ2 − d02), d1P2 = d02). After the bailout, the country rolls over the
remaining debt such that the level of long-term debt is eventually d12 = Φ2+φ2. There
is no default at date 1.
• If d01 > φ1 − δρd02 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− ρ)φ2, the Principal does not intervene, there is too
much debt to rollover, and the country defaults at date 1.
Second case: positive income at date 1
If the country has a positive income y1 = y¯1 at date 1, it can repay its debt, but may
be willing not to do so if it is more costly for it than to default. In this case, the Principal
can propose to repurchase some of the country’s debt (d01−d1P1 , d02−d1P2 ), and the country
can decide to rollover some of its debt to the next period d1R2 . After both the bailout and
the rollover, the remaining debt (d11, d12) must be such that the country is willing to repay
d11 if a default is to be prevented. See the details of the resolution in the Appendix online.
Lemma 4.4 (Date 1, Positive income)
0 ≤ d02 ≤ φ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ Φ1 − δρd02, the country repays its debt without rollover or bailout. There
is no default at date 1.
• If Φ1 − δρd02 < d01 ≤ Φ1 + δ(1 − ρ)φ2 − δd02, the country rolls over some of its debt
such that the level of long-term debt is eventually d12 = d02 +
d01−Φ1+δρd02
δ(1−ρ) ≤ φ2, and
repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
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• If Φ1 + δ(1− ρ)φ2 − δd02 < d01 ≤ φ1 + Φ1 − δd02, the Principal proposes to repurchase
some of the debt of the country to bring back debt levels to (d1P1 = Φ1 + δ(1− ρ)φ2−
δd1P2 , d
1P
2 ≤ d02). After the bailout, the country rolls over some of the remaining debt
such that the level of long-term debt is eventually d12 = φ2, and repays the rest. There
is no default at date 1.
• If d01 > φ1 + Φ1 − δd02, the Principal does not intervene, there is too much debt to
rollover, and the country defaults at date 1.
φ2 < d
0
2 ≤ φ1δ + ρφ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ Φ1 − δρd02 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2, the country repays its debt without rollover or
bailout. There is no default at date 1.
• If Φ1 − δρd02 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 < d01 ≤ δ(1 − ρ)d02 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 − δφ2, the country
rolls over some of its debt such that the level of long-term debt is eventually Φ2 <
d12 = d
0
2 +
d01−Φ1+δΦ2
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, and repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
• If δ(1 − ρ)d02 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 − δφ2 < d01 ≤ Φ1 − δρφ2, the Principal proposes
to repurchase some of the long-term debt of the country to bring back debt levels
to (d1P1 = d01, d1P2 = φ2). After the bailout, the country repays the remaining debt.
There is no default at dates 1 and 2.
• If Φ1−δρφ2 < d01 ≤ φ1+Φ1−δd02, the Principal proposes to repurchase some of debt of
the two maturities to bring back debt levels to (d1P1 = Φ1+δ(1−ρ)φ2−δd1P2 , d1P2 ≤ φ2).
After the bailout, the country rolls over some of the remaining debt such that the level
of long-term debt is eventually d12 = φ2, and repays the rest. There is no default at
date 1, and no default at date 2.
• If d01 > φ1 + Φ1 − δd02, the Principal does not intervene, there is too much debt to
rollover, and the country defaults at date 1.
φ1
δ
+ ρ¯φ2 < d
0
2 ≤ Φ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ Φ1 − δρd02 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2, the country repays its debt without rollover or
bailout. There is no default at date 1.
• If Φ1 − δρd02 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 < d01 ≤ Φ1 − δρd02 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 + δρφ2, the country rolls
over some of its debt such that the level of long-term debt is eventually Φ2 < d12 =
d02 +
d01−Φ1+δΦ2
δρ
≤ Φ2 + φ2, and repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
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• If Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 + δρφ2 − δρd02 < d01 ≤ φ1 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)(Φ2 + φ2) − δρd02, the
Principal proposes to repurchase some of the short-term debt of the country to bring
back debt levels to (d1P1 = Φ1−δ(1−ρ)Φ2 +δρφ2−δρd02, d1P2 = d02). After the bailout,
the country rolls over some of the remaining debt such that the level of long-term
debt is eventually d12 = Φ2 + φ2, and repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
• If d01 > φ1 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)(Φ2 + φ2) − δρd02, the Principal does not intervene, there
is too much debt to rollover, and the country defaults.
Φ2 < d
0
2 ≤ Φ2 + φ2
• If 0 ≤ d01 ≤ Φ1 − δΦ2, the country repays its debt without rollover or bailout. There
is no default at date 1.
• If Φ1−δΦ2 < d01 ≤ Φ1−δρd02−δ(1−ρ)Φ2+δρφ2, the country rolls over some of its debt
such that the level of long-term debt is eventually Φ2 < d12 = d02+
d01−Φ1+δΦ2
δρ
≤ Φ2+φ2,
and repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
• If Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)Φ2 + δρφ2 − δρd02 < d01 ≤ φ1 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)(Φ2 + φ2) − δρd02, the
Principal proposes to repurchase some of the short-term debt of the country to bring
back debt levels to (d1P1 = Φ1−δ(1−ρ)Φ2 +δρφ2−δρd02, d1P2 = d02). After the bailout,
the country rolls over some of the remaining debt such that the level of long-term
debt is eventually d12 = Φ2 + φ2, and repays the rest. There is no default at date 1.
• If d01 > φ1 + Φ1 − δ(1 − ρ)(Φ2 + φ2) − δρd02, the Principal does not intervene, there
is too much debt to rollover, and the country defaults.
Date 0: Country’s optimal borrowing strategy
At date 0, the country chooses its initial debt portfolio (d01, d02) taking into account the
bailout strategy of the Principal, and its rollover and default decisions at dates 1 and 2.
I solve simultaneously for the initial amount of borrowings b0 and the interest rates paid
on debt.
Country’s borrowing strategies
Let us consider the possible borrowing strategies for the country. Strategies that are
strictly dominated are excluded from the analysis (see the Appendix online for more de-
tails). In every situation, the country solves:
max
{d01,d02}
{
R
(
(1 + r01)d
0
1 + (1 + r
0
2)
2d02
)
+ E0
(
2∑
t=1
δt(yt − xtdtt − (1− xt)xt−1Φt)
)}
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• (a)
{
d01 ≤ δ(φ2 − d02)
d02 ≤ φ2
There is no default at any date so that interest rates are risk-free 1+r1 = 1+r2 = δ.
The country is thus able to borrow initially b0 = δd01 + δ2d02. There is a unique
solution (d01 = 0, d02 = φ2) bringing initial utility to the country:
UCa (R) = Rδ
2φ2 + δαy¯1 + δ
2(αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ)(y¯2 − φ2)
• (b)
{
δρ(Φ2 − d02) < d01 ≤ φ1 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− ρ)φ2 − δρd02
d02 ≤ φ2
There is no risk of default at date 1, but a risk at date 2 of the country has consec-
utively no income at both dates. The country is thus able to borrow initially b0 =
δd01 + δ
2(α+ (1−α)ρ)d02. There is a unique solution: (d01 = φ1 + δρΦ2− δφ2, d02 = φ2)
bringing initial utility to the country:
UCb (R) = Rδ
(
φ1 + δρΦ2 − δ(1− α)(1− ρ)φ2
)
+ δαy¯1 + δ
2(αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ)y¯2 − δαφ1
−δ2(1− α(1− ρ))Φ2 + δ2α(1− ρ)φ2
• (c)
{
max(Φ1 + δ(1− ρ)φ2 − δd02,Φ1 − δρφ2) < d01 ≤ φ1 + Φ1 − δd02
d02 ≤ φ1δ + ρφ2
There is a risk of default at date 1 if the country has no income, but no more
risk at date 2 provided the country did not default at date 1. The country is thus
able to borrow initially b0 = δαd01 + δ2αd02. There is a unique solution: (d01 =
φ1 + Φ1 − δd02, d02 ≤ φ2) bringing initial utility to the country:
UCc (R) = Rδα (φ1 + Φ1) + δαy¯1 + δ
2(αρ¯+ (1− α)ρ)y¯2 − δΦ1
Analysis of the different borrowing strategies
Let us compare together the different borrowing strategies:
UCb (R) ≥ UCa (R)⇔ R ≥ Rba =
αφ1 + δ(1− α(1− ρ))Φ2 − δ(α + (1− α)ρ)φ2
φ1 + δρΦ2 + δ(1 + (1− α)(1− ρ))φ2
UCc (R) ≥ UCb (R)⇔ R ≥ Rcb =
Φ1 − αφ1 − δΦ2 + δα(1− ρ)(Φ2 + φ2)
αΦ1 − (1− α)φ1 − δρΦ2 + δ(1− α)(1− ρ)φ2
To simplify the analysis, let us assume that Φ1 = Φ2 and that φ1 = φ2 = γΦ1 = γΦ2 with
γ << 1. We also assume that income realizations are independent across dates 1 and 2,
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that is α = ρ¯ = ρ. Under these assumptions, we obtain:
Rba =
αγ + δ − δα(1− α)− δα(2− α)γ
γ + δα− δ(α + (1− α)2)γ =γ=0
1− α(1− α)
α
Rcb =
1− αγ − δ(1− α(1− α)(1 + γ))
α− (1− α)γ − δ(α− (1− α)2γ) =γ=0
1− δ(1− α(1− α))
α(1− δ)
Notice that for a very small γ, by continuity, both thresholds are above 1. Furthermore,
I obtain under the same assumption that:
Rcb ≥ Rba
• When 1 ≤ R < Rba = R1, the country chooses strategy (a)
• When Rba < R ≥ Rcb = R2, the country chooses strategy (b)
• When R > Rcb, the country chooses strategy (c)
Remark: the assumption that R ≥ 1 guarantees that borrowing is always optimal for
the country. More precisely, R ≥ α would be enough.
Appendix 3: Setup with only Long- or Short-term debt
See the Appendix online.
Appendix 4: Setup without potential bailout
See the Appendix online.
Appendix 5: Welfare Analysis
See the Appendix online.
Appendix 6: ex ante policies
See the Appendix online.
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